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THE MATHEW 0. TOBRINER
MEMORIAL LECTURE.*
Divided We Stand: State Constitutions in
a More Perfect Union
Shirley S. Abrahamson**
I am honored to be delivering the Tobriner lecture at this distin-
guished law school. I did not have the privilege of knowing Justice To-
briner personally, but I have come to know him through his judicial
decisions, his extrajudicial writings and the numerous scholarly reviews
of his work and tributes of his many friends.1
* The Mathew 0. Tobriner Memorial Lecture, given each year at Hastings College of
the Law, was established to honor the life work and social vision of Justice Mathew 0. Tobri-
ner of the Supreme Court of California. The Lecture serves as a permanent memorial to this
outstanding legal scholar and jurist.
This essay is a slightly expanded and annotated version of the Mathew 0. Tobriner Me-
morial Lecture delivered at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law, on No-
vember 14, 1990. I wish to thank Jillian Carnahan, Diana Cook, Gretchen Engel, and Faith
Spencer for their assistance in the preparation of the manuscript for publication.
** Justice, Wisconsin Supreme Court. A.B., New York University, 1953; J.D., Indiana
University, 1956; S.J.D., University of Wisconsin, 1962.
1. See, e.g., Tobriner & Grodin, The Individual and the Public Service Enterprise in the
New Industrial State, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 1247 (1967); Tobriner, Retrospec" Ten Years on the
California Supreme Court, 20 UCLA L. REv. 5 (1972); Tobriner, Can Young Lawyers Reform
Society Through the Courts?, 47 CALIF. ST. B.J. 294 (1972); Tobriner, Individual Rights in an
Industrialized Society, 54 A.B.A. J. 21 (1968); Bird, Grodin & Sullivan, In Memoriam Mathew
0. Tobriner, 33 HASrINGs L.J. xiii-xiv (July 1982); Bird, Justice Mathew 0. Tobriner - The
Heart of a Lion, The Soul of a Dove, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 871 (1982); Tribe, Remembering
Mathew Tobriner, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 876 (1982); Balabanian, Justice Was More Than His
Title, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 878 (1982); Bird, Justice Mathew 0. Tobriner-A Man of Uncommon
Grace, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 161 (1984); Grodin, Justice Tobriner: Portrait of the Judge
as an Artist, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 7 (1977); Pearlman, Welfare Administration and the Rights of
Welfare Recipients, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 19 (1977); Willemsen, Justice Tobriner and the Toler-
ance of Evolving Life Styles: Adapting the Law to Social Change, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 73 (1977);
Sloss & Becker, The Organization Affected with a Public Interest and Its Members-Justice
Tobriner's Contribution to Evolving Common Law Doctrine, 29 HAsTINGS L.J. 99 (1977); Adler
& Mosk, Justice Tobriner and Real Property, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 127 (1977); Kamarck, Opening
the Gate The Steven Case and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 29 HASTINGs L.J. 153
(1977); Horvitz, Justice Tobriner's Tort Decisions: A Reaffirmation of the Common Law Pro-
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OUARTERLY
Two principles about which I shall speak emerge from Justice To-
briner's work. First, though respectful of history and precedent and
aware of the importance of continuity, Justice Tobriner recognized that
the law does not stand still but adapts to changing social and economic
conditions.
Second, Justice Tobriner viewed courts as the guardians of individ-
ual rights and equal justice. An independent judiciary, he concluded,
plays a vital role in affording to every individual protection against the
government and against private centers of power.
I speak today about law and individual rights in the context of state
constitutions, a subject well known to Justice Tobriner. When asked in
February 1982 whether he agreed with Professor Anthony Amsterdam's
comment that lawyers should go to the state supreme court on certain
constitutional issues, Justice Tobriner is quoted as saying: "I think that's
true. Our court has taken the position that we will protect the funda-
mental rights of the state constitution, and that we will do so even if the
U.S. Supreme Court rules contrary to that."2
And that's what I'm going to talk about: state courts' protection of
fundamental rights under the state constitutions.
I shall explore cases in three areas of constitutional law: (1) individ-
ual rights against unreasonable search and seizure; (2) individual rights
to free speech; and (3) individual rights to education.
The cases show that state courts are increasingly deciding cases
under their state constitutions; that examining state constitutional rights
is a process with varying results; that although most state constitutional
law decisions adopt the federal interpretation of individual rights, a sig-
nificant number of decisions deviate from federal interpretation; that the
development of state constitutional law depends to a substantial degree
on the constitutional issue involved; and that individual rights are best
protected through dialogue among the state and federal courts.
State constitutional law has deep roots in our legal system and can
foster not a weaker but a stronger union of states. Thus my title Divided
We Stand: State Constitutions in a More Perfect Union.3
cess, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 167 (1977); Note, Untangling Tarasoff. Tarasoff v. Regents of the
University of California, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 179 (1977).
2. Mathew 0. Tobriner: Reflecting on the High Court, CAL. LAW., Feb. 1982, at 48.
3. "If a house be divided against itself, that house cannot stand."--Mark 3:25; "A house
divided against itself cannot stand."-Abrahamn Lincoln, Speech to Republican State Conven-
tion, Springfield, Illinois, June 16, 1858.
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I. Individual Rights Against Unreasonable Search and Seizure
We look first at criminal cases and protection of the criminal de-
fendant against unreasonable search and seizure, in particular, search
and seizure of garbage. If your home is your castle, what about your
royal garbage? Garbage is garbage, but the history of garbage is, accord-
ing to academicians, scholarship.
Since the late 1960s many courts have been faced with the question
of whether law enforcement officers who do not have search warrants
may search and seize personal property deposited in garbage containers
awaiting disposal.4 The facts in the garbage cases are remarkably simi-
lar. Garbage tied in green, white, or otherwise opaque plastic bags is
placed at the curb, in a dumpster or on the macadam. The police make a
warrantless search of the suspect's garbage. The contents of the garbage
are used as evidence in a criminal prosecution.
The issue presented to the courts is whether a warrantless garbage
search constitutes an unreasonable search violating an individual's rea-
sonable expectation of privacy. Most cases hold that "the police have the
same right to go through your garbage as the average raccoon .... "'
4. See, eg., United States v. Dela Espriella, 781 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1986); United
States v. O'Bryant, 775 F.2d 1528, 1533-34 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Michaels, 726
F.2d 1307, 1312-13 (8th Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 820 (1984); United States v. Kramer,
711 F.2d 789, 791-94 (7th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 464 U.S. 962 (1983); United States v. Terry,
702 F.2d 299, 308-09 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. 461 U.S. 931 (1983); United States
v. Vahalik, 606 F.2d 99, 100-01 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980); United
States v. Crowell, 586 F.2d 1020, 1024-25 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 959 (1979);
United States v. Mustone, 469 F.2d 970, 972-73 (1st Cir. 1972); State v. Kyles, 513 So.2d 265,
269-70 (La. 1987); Commonwealth v. Chappee, 397 Mass. 508, 511-13, 492 N.E.2d 719, 721-
22 (1986); State v. Tanaka, 67 Haw. 658-60, 701 P.2d 1274, 1276 (1985); P'eople v. Rooney,
175 Cal. App. 3d 634, 641 P.2d 53 (1985), 221 Cal. Rptr. 49; State v. Roungren, 361 N.W.2d
224, 228-30 (N.D. 1985); Cooks v. State, 699 P.2d 653, 656 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 935 (1985); State v. Stevens, 123 Wis. 2d 303, 314-20, 367 N.W.2d 788, 794-
97 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 852 (1985); State v. Brown, 20 Ohio App. 3d 36, 37-39, 484
N.E.2d 215, 217-18 (1984); State v. Oquist, 327 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1982); People v. Whotte,
113 Mich. App. 12, 317 N.W.2d 266 (1982); Commonwealth v. Minton, 288 Pa. Super. 390-
93, 432 A.2d 212, 215-18 (1981); State v. Schultz, 388 So. 2d 1326 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980);
People v. Huddleston, 38 Il1. App. 3d 277, 347 N.E.2d 76 (1976); Willis v. State, 518 S.W.2d
247, 249 ('ex. Crim. App. 1975); Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1086 (1973); People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971),
vacated and remanded sub nom. California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972), reh'g denied, 409
U.S. 1068, affid on remand sub nom. People v. Krivda, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 521 (1973); State v. Fassler, 108 Ariz. 586, 592-93, 503 P.2d 807, 813-14 (1972); Croker
v. State, 477 P.2d 122, 125-26 (Wyo. 1970); People v. Edwards, 71 Cal. 2d 1096, 1104-05, 458
P.2d 713, 715-18, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633, 634-38 (1969); State v. Purvis, 249 Or. 404, 411, 438 P.2d
1002, 1005 (1968).
5. Ehrenreich, Keeping Garbage in the Family, MOTHER JONES, Sept. 1988, at 10.
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The cases have caught the attention of the popular press, as well as
the law reviews, and inspired articles with such catchy titles as Keeping
Garbage in the Family,6 Trash Piles of the Rich and Famous,7 Lifting the
Lid on Garbage,8 and The Last Rights of Garbage.9
These cases are not, as the legal and popular press recognize, simply
about garbage. They are about protecting individual rights to privacy,
about law enforcement officers combatting crime, and about federalism-
the relation of state and federal constitutions and state and federal
courts. As Curtis Sitomer wrote in the Christian Science Monitor, "Gar-
bage, in the abstract, may appear to be trivial. In principle, however,
when trash becomes evidence in a criminal trial, it takes on a whole new
constitutional aroma."' 1
Our story starts in 1971 with a California case, People v. Krivda.1'
The California Supreme Court, by a divided vote, with Justice Tobriner
in the majority, held that a police search of the defendant's trash barrels
without a warrant was illegal and that the evidence had to be suppressed.
When the state sought review, the United States Supreme Court vacated
the California judgment and remanded the case to the California
Supreme Court to state whether it based its holding on the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution, or upon the
equivalent provision of the California constitution, or upon both. 2 The
California constitution, like many state constitutions, protects individu-
als against unreasonable searches and seizures, using virtually the same
language as the Fourth Amendment.' 3
6. Id.
7. Trash Piles of the Rich and Famous, Bus. WK., Oct. 30, 1989, at 20A.
8. Lifting the Lid on Garbage: The High Court Gives Police Broad Power to Search Trash,
TIME, May 30, 1988, at 54.
9. The Last Rights of Garbage, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 30, 1988, at 9. The
warrantless search and seizure of garbage has even attracted Hollywood's attention, serving as
the premise for the film The Star Chamber. "The script depicts two painful cases... in the
court of a California judge. This judge is then elevated to a nine-member Superior Court and
finds that his colleagues are a self-appointed Star Chamber, secretly engaged in rectifying injus-
tices caused by the exclusionary rule." Stanley Kauffman on Films, NEW REPUBLIC, Septem-
ber 19 & 26, 1983.
10. Sitomer, When Garbage Is Not Trash, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Aug. 23, 1990, at
14.
11. 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971).
12. California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972).
13. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 13. This section provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated; and a warrant may
not issue except on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized.
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The United States Supreme Court was unwilling to review Califor-
nia's Krivda decision until it knew which constitution governed the case.
It was well aware that if the state constitution protected the defendant's
rights there was no issue for the United States Supreme Court to review.
Ironically, had Krivda been decided in 1985 instead of in 1972, the
United States Supreme Court probably would not have remanded the
case. The United States Supreme Court held in 1983, in Michigan v.
Long,14 that absent a state court's plain statement that the decision rests
on adequate and independent state grounds, the United States Supreme
Court will presume that the state court resolved the issue on federal con-
stitutional grounds.15
Upon remand from the United States Supreme Court a unanimous
California court concluded that it had relied in Krivda on both the fed-
eral and California constitutions, and that the California constitution fur-
nished an independent ground to support the decision.16 Thus, the
United States Supreme Court would not review this case.
What a surprise! A search and seizure case turning on state consti-
tutional law. Most Americans in the early 1970s, including most lawyers
and judges, identified civil liberties with the federal constitution. Im-
mersed in the Warren court decisions, few thought about state constitu-
tions. But for most of this country's history, from 1787 to 1925, state
law-that is, the common law, state statutes and state constitutions-
was the primary guarantor of individual rights against infringement by
14. 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983).
15. In a January 27, 1988 address to the National Conference of Chief Justices in Wil-
liamsburg, Virginia, Chief Justice Rehnquist commented on the Michigan v. Long holding.
He acknowledged that the case "has received its share of criticism." He recounted the criti-
cism, defended the decision, and argued that the state courts may construe their state constitu-
tions as they wish but must take responsibility for their actions. He said:
Some believe that it reflects hostility to the resurgence of interest in the development
of state constitutional rules that offer greater protection of individual rights than is
offered by cognate provisions of the United States Constitution. I think this view is
mistaken. Our court has neither the authority nor the inclination to oppose efforts to
construe state constitutional provisions more liberally than their federal counterparts
are construed. The [state constitutional law] movement is a classic example of Jus-
tice Brandeis' praise for the federal system as making possible experimentation in
fifty different state laboratories to see what the proper solution to a question is. But I
think that those who undertake these "experiments," to use Justice Brandeis' term,
must be willing to assume the responsibility for doing so... whatever the methods of
accountability may be in your state, they can be pursued by whatever number of
people choose to avail themselves of those methods.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Remarks at the National Conference of Chief Justices,
Williamsburg, Virginia (Jan. 27, 1988), in Materials for the State Constitutional Law Seminar
(March 11, 1988), Washington, D.C. (sponsored by the National Association of Attorneys
General State Constitutional Law Clearinghouse Project).
16. People v. Krivda, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 624, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1973).
728 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 18:723
the state government. For most of this country's history the federal bill
of rights was viewed as protecting individuals solely against federal gov-
ernment encroachment.
17
In 1925 the United States Supreme Court began to apply selected
federal constitutional guarantees to the states.18 This process, known as
selective incorporation, accelerated in the 1960s so that by the early
1970s most of the criminal justice guarantees in the Bill of Rights were
applicable to state law enforcement officers.19
The United States Supreme Court's selective incorporation resulted,
however, in federal domination of civil liberties law. As can be seen in
the numerous state garbage cases in the 1970s and 1980s, litigants and
state courts typically ignored state bills of rights or, without discussion,
treated similar state and federal provisions as interchangeable.20 In con-
trast to the Krivda case, most federal and state courts upheld garbage
searches under the federal constitution.21
Only a few state courts, Wisconsin being one of them, examined
both the federal and state constitutions in deciding garbage cases. Wis-
consin upheld the garbage search under both constitutions.22 Abraham-
son, J., dissenting. Hawaii alone struck down a garbage search under its
own state constitution.
23
17. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State Consti-
tutional Law, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1141, 1144-45 (1985); Abrahamson, Reincarnation .of State
Courts, 36 Sw. L.J. 951, 956 (1982).
18. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
19. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions, supra note 17, at 1147.
20. See, e.g., Cooks v. State, 699 P.2d 653 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985); State v. Kyles, 513
So. 2d 265 (La. 1987); Commonwealth v. Chappee, 397 Mass. 508, 492 N.E.2d 719 (1986);
State v. Ronngren, 361 N.W.2d 224 (N.D. 1985); State v. Brown, 20 Ohio App. 3d 36, 484
N.E.2d 215 (1984); State v. Oquist, 327 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1982); People v. Whotte, 113
Mich. App. 12, 317 N.W.2d 266 (1982); Commonwealth v. Minton, 288 Pa. Super. 381, 432
A.2d 212 (1981); State v. Schultz, 388 So. 2d 1326 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); People v. Hud-
dleston, 38 Ill. App. 3d 277, 347 N.E.2d 76 (1976); Willis v. State, 518 S.W.2d 247 (rex. Crim.
App. 1975); State v. Fassler, 108 Ariz. 586, 503 P.2d 807 (1972); Croker v. State, 477 P.2d 122
(Wyo. 1970); State v. Purvis, 249 Or. 404, 438 P.2d 1002 (1968).
21. Before Greenwood v. California, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), California and Hawaii alone
prohibited warrantless searches of garbage under their state constitutions. See, eg., State v.
Tanaka, 67 Haw. 658, 659-62, 701 P.2d 1274, 1275-76 (1985); People v. Rooney, 175 Cal.
App. 3d 634, 221 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1985); People v. Krivda, 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 62 (1971), vacated and remanded sub nom. California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972),
reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 1068, aff'd on remand sub nom. People v. Krivda, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504
P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1973); People v. Edwards, 71 Cal. 2d 1096,458 P.2d 713, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 633 (1969).
22. State v. Stevens, 123 Wis. 2d 303, 309, 367 N.W.2d 788, 792 (1985) (Heffernan, C.J.,
Abrahamson, J., and Bablitch, J., dissenting). See also Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793, 795 n.4
(Alaska 1973), cert denied, 414 U.S. 1086 (1973).
23. State v. Tanaka, 67 Haw. 658, 659-62, 701 P.2d 1274, 1275-76 (1985).
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When the United States Supreme Court did rule on the Fourth
Amendment protections against garbage searches, it held, seven to two,
in California v. Greenwood24 that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the United States Constitution did not prohibit the warrantless
search and seizure of garbage left for collection outside the curtilage of a
home.2 The United States Supreme Court viewed its conclusion that
society would not accept an accused's claim to a reasonable expectation
of privacy in trash left for collection as reinforced by federal courts of
appeals that unanimously rejected similar claims of privacy and the nu-
merous state courts that held that police may conduct warrantless
searches and seizures of garbage.26
In the two years since Greenwood, at least seven state appellate
24. 486 U.S. 35 (1988). For commentary on the Greenwood decision, see e.g., 1 LA FAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.6 (c) (2d ed. 1987) at 59-63 (1991 Supp.); Note, California v.
Greenwood: Discarding the Traditional Approach to the Search and Seizure of Garbage, 38
CATH. U.L. Rv. 543 (1989); Note, Warrantless Search and Seizure of Curbside Garbage:
California v. Greenwood 108 S.Ct. 1625 (1988), 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 361 (1989); Note, Califor-
nia v. Greenwood, Supreme Court Decides to Keep the Fourth Amendment Out of the Trash, 67
N.C.L. REv. 1191 (1989); Herprich, California v. Greenwood: The Trashing of Privacy, 38
AM. U.L. REV. 993 (1989).
25. The Greenwood case began in the California court system. People v. Greenwood, 182
Cal. App. 3d 729, 227 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1986). In 1986, the California courts again had to
decide a garbage case. The United States Supreme Court had not squarely ruled on the issue.
Krivda was thus binding precedent in California that a warrantless search of trash barrels left
for routine collection violated the federal and California constitutions. 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P.2d
457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1973). The Court of Appeals in Greenwood suppressed the evidence
from the garbage search, resting its decision on federal, not state, constitutional law. Id. at
735, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 542. The reason for this clear demarcation of authority lies in an
amendment to the California constitution adopted after Krivda but before Greenwood. Id. at
735, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 541-42, citing CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 28(d). The amendment provides
that relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding. Id. The California
Supreme Court interpreted the amendment as abrogating a defendant's right to object to and
suppress evidence seized in violation of the California, but not the federal Constitution. In re
Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 886-90, 694 P.2d 744, 752-55, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631, 639-42 (1985).
Thus in order to suppress the evidence against him, Billy Greenwood was required to prevail
in the California courts on fourth amendment grounds. For discussion of the amendment to
the California constitution and the Lance case, see J. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE, 113-
15 (1989).
26. 486 U.S. at 41-43. The Court commented in note 5 to the opinion: "Given that the
dissenters are among the tiny minority of judges whose views are contrary to ours, we are
distinctly unimpressed with the dissent's prediction that 'society will be shocked to learn' of
today's decision."
I have conducted my own unscientific survey of Wisconsinites' views on garbage. The
general consensus of my audiences is that what's in their garbage is their private business and
that law enforcement officers should not be rummaging through garbage without a warrant.
These views raise questions about how a court determines society's reasonable expectation of
privacy.
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courts have decided garbage cases.2 7 Each court, except Alabama's,28
examined its state constitution, often with only cursory examination of
state constitutional history and state constitutional law interpretation.
Four state courts found the United States Supreme Court's Greenwood
decision persuasive authority for interpreting the state constitution. The
fact remains, however, that the state courts applied their own
constitutions.
The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded, in July 1990, that its
state constitution required law enforcement officials to have a warrant
based on probable cause to search garbage left on the curb for collec-
tion.2 9 The New Jersey majority essentially disagreed with the Green-
wood majority opinion and amplified and adopted Justices Marshall's
and Brennan's dissent. The New Jersey court repudiated the holdings of
"virtually every other court that has considered the issue," 120 N.J. 224,
576 A.2d 814, declaring that "'the trouble with those cases is that they
are flatly and simply wrong as to the matter of the way people think
about garbage.' ,30 To the New Jersey Supreme Court, permitting police
27. State v. Hempele, 120 N.J. 182, 576 A.2d 793 (1990); State v. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d
571, 800 P.2d 1112 (1990); Commonwealth v. Pratt, 407 Mass. 647, 659-61, 555 N.E.2d 559,
567-68 (1990); People v. Pinnix, 174 Mich. App. 445, 436 N.W.2d 692 (1989); State v. Hender-
son, 435 N.W.2d 394 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988); State v. Trahan, 229 Neb. 673, 686-89, 428
N.W.2d 619, 622-23 (1988); People v. Thivierge, 174 Mich. App. 258, 435 N.W.2d 446 (1988).
28. Walls v. State, 536 So. 2d 137, 139 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988).
29. State v. Hempele, 120 N.J. 182, 221, 576 A.2d 793, 813 (1990). The day after this
lecture was delivered, Nov. 15, 1990, the Washington Supreme Court handed down its deci-
sion declaring unconstitutional under its state constitution the warrantless search of garbage.
State v. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d 571, 800 P.2d 1112 (1990). The Washington Supreme Court
concluded that the Washington constitution protects privacy interests which may not be cov-
ered by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at 575, 800 P.2d at
1114. Violation of a right of privacy under the Washington constitution "turns on whether the
State has unreasonably intruded into a person's 'private affairs.' "aId. at 577, 800 P.2d at 1115
(quoting State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 510-11, 688 P.2d 151, 153-54 (1984)). The court
said the difference between the state and the federal constitutions concerning the right of pri-
vacy is as follows:
Const. art. 1, § 7 analysis encompasses those legitimate privacy expectations pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment, but is not confined to the subjective privacy expec-
tations of modem citizens who, due to well-publicized advances in surveillance
technology, are learning to expect diminished privacy in many aspects of their lives.
Rather, it focuses on those privacy interests which citizens of this state have held,
and should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass absent a warrant.
120 N.J. at 195-97, 576 A.2d at 799-801.
The court held that the defendant's "private affairs" were unreasonably intruded upon when
the law enforcement officers searched his garbage without a warrant. Id at 223, 576 A.2d at
814.
30. 120 N.J. at 225-26, 576 A.2d at 814-15. According to the court, "Our decision today
does not follow the course set by the [United States] Supreme Court because 'we are persuaded
that the equities so strongly favor protection of a person's privacy interest that we should apply
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to pick their way through garbage bags like Templeton the Rat and to
peruse the vestiges of a person's private affairs is repugnant to the ideal of
the right to be let alone-the right embraced in the state constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure.
In contrast to the New Jersey justices, many state judges approach
their state constitutions with almost a presumption that the state consti-
tution is to be interpreted in the same way as the federal constitution.
Many state judges, including two dissenters in the New Jersey garbage
case, object vigorously to state courts interpreting state constitutional
provisions differently from the federal constitution unless special circum-
stances exist.
31
But should not different opinions about individual rights in search
and seizure cases be expected and accepted? Differences of opinion are
inevitable as judges must reconcile the competing needs of law enforce-
ment officers and rights of individuals. Courts are caught between the
need to protect public safety and a constitutional obligation to protect
individual rights in a society that perceives a mounting incidence of
crime.
Differences in interpretation of the state and federal constitutions
should be viewed, I believe, as examples of the difficulties of interpreting
language, especially the broad phrases of a bill of rights. Not all judges
will necessarily agree on a single interpretation of language-whether a
contract, statute or constitution. While we are comfortable with the idea
that the Uniform Commercial Code, for example, might be interpreted
differently by each state, we balk at the idea of interpreting identical fed-
eral and state constitutional provisions differently. Why is this so?
We accept division of opinion within the United States Supreme
Court on interpretations of constitutional language. We accept modifica-
tions by the United States Supreme Court in its interpretation of an un-
amended federal constitution. Often, however, judges and commentators
find unacceptable a state court's interpretation of a state constitutional
provision that is different from five of the nine United States Supreme
Court justices' interpretation of a virtually identical federal constitu-
tional provision. Why should state courts not closely examine a federal
decision to determine whether it is sufficiently persuasive to warrant
adoption into state law?
Our discomfort when a state court deviates from the United States
Supreme Court in the area of criminal constitutional law can be ex-
our own standard rather than defer to the federal provision.'" Id at 223, 576 A.2d at 814
(citation omitted).
31. Id. at 228-29, 576 A.2d at 816-17.
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plained in several ways. First, this body of law encompasses individual
rights that we characterize as fundamental. We have a hard time grasp-
ing that judges should differ over fundamentals. If the right is funda-
mental, we shrink from readily accepting contradictory interpretations of
it.
Furthermore, state judges experience a sense of chutzpah in express-
ing disagreement with the United States Supreme Court. Judges are ac-
customed to thinking in a hierarchical way, and the United States
Supreme Court is at the top of the ladder. This attitude was evidenced
by one of the dissenting New Jersey justices who warned that "one of the
unanticipated consequences of that supposedly benign doctrine of state-
constitutional rights is an inevitable shadowing of the moral authority of
the United States Supreme Court. Throughout our history, we have
maintained a resolute trust in that Court as the guardian of our liber-
ties." 2 Others do not believe that interpretation of a state constitution
by a state supreme court-the court with the duty to interpret the docu-
ment-in any way diminishes the moral force of the United States
Supreme Court.
33
Finally, many state court judges believe that uniformity between
state and federal constitutional interpretation of search and seizure pro-
visions is itself a positive value. On a philosophical level, they regard the
state constitutional law movement as threatening the vision of one nation
under law.34 On a practical level they deplore the need for law enforce-
ment officers to learn two sets of legal principles. They worry that citi-
zens will be confused when they find that under virtually identical
constitutional provisions it is permissible for a federal agent, but not a
state law enforcement officer, to search garbage without a warrant. One
of the New Jersey dissenting justices was persuaded that different federal
and state treatment of the ordinary commodity of garbage would appear
32. Hempele, 120 N.J. at 226, 576 A.2d at 815 (O'Hern, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
33. See, e.g., Pool v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 98, 108, 677 P.2d 261, 271 (1984) (United
States Supreme Court decisions have "great weight in interpreting" the double jeopardy provi-
sion, art. II, § 10 of the Arizona constitution, because uniformity is desirable, but federal
precedents should not be followed blindly); State v. Arrington, 311 N.C. 633, 642-43, 319
S.E.2d 254, 260 (1984) (according "great weight" to search and seizure decisions of the United
States Supreme Court, but holding them not to be binding as to questions exclusively concern-
ing state law and adopting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)).
34. In truth, the constitutional vision that we have shared as a people is not one of
state constitutional guarantees of freedom. Whether God-given or the result of social
compact, the content of our freedom under law is drawn from the Bill of Rights. I
rather doubt that most Americans think otherwise.
Hempele, 120 N.J. at 227, 576 A.2d at 816 (O'Hern, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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illogical to the public and that the public would distrust a legal system
that develops such distinctions.
35
In contrast, other judges and commentators perceive the emphasis
on uniformity as impinging on deeply rooted traditions of federal and
state constitutional interpretation, state sovereignty and federalism. 36 To
them disparity among federal and state court interpretations has positive
benefits. They envision a federal system-horizontal and vertical federal-
ism-that fosters a continuing dialogue among courts as courts search
for sound constitutional interpretation in a changing world. Most crimi-
nal cases arise in state courts, and state judges as well as federal judges
have expertise in dealing with search and seizure issues. Moreover, if a
state errs, the error does not take on national importance and is corrected
fairly easily. Diversity, as Chief Justice Rehnquist reminds us, is to be
cherished and applauded under the theory that states serve as "social
laboratories."
37
For contrast, let us turn to the free speech cases.
35. Such distinctions between federal and state constitutions are difficult for a citizen
to fathom .... Different treatment of such an ordinary commodity [as garbage] ap-
pears illogical to the public and hence breeds a fundamental distrust of the legal
system that develops such distinctions.
Id. at 230, 576 A.2d at 817 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
36. See also State v. Kimbro, 197 Conn. 219, 234-351, 496 A.2d 498, 506-07 (1985) (dis-
cussing the court's duty to interpret state-guaranteed fundamental civil liberties); Brown v.
State, 657 S.W.2d 797, 807 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (parroting opinions of the United States
Supreme Court denigrates "the special importance our Texas forbearers attached to their
rights" declared in the state constitution) (Clinton, J., concurring); State v. Badger, 141 Vt.
430, 447-49, 450 A.2d 336, 346-47 (1982) (state constitution is not a "mere reflection of the
federal charter"; constitution's role in federalist system compels court to address state consti-
tutional issues); Roberts v. State, 458 P.2d 340, 342 (Alaska 1969) ("To look only to the
United States Supreme Court for constitutional guidance would be an abdication by this court
of its constitutional responsibilities").
37. In a now famous dissent, Justice Brandeis referred to states as "laboratories" for
social and economic experimentation. "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system
that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." New State Ice Co. v.
Liebermann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
No one suggests that the state courts be the sole guardians of individual liberty. Linde, E
Pluribus-Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REv. 165, 200 (1984) (asserting
that the revitalization of state constitutional law is no excuse to weaken national safeguards);
Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379,
395 (1980) (noting that although no state can reject the minimum national standard, states can
expand the standards); Abrahamson, Homegrown Justice: The State Constitutions, ch. 11 in
DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE WILLIAMSBURG CONFERENCE (Mc-
Graw ed. 1985), at 314 (noting the continuing need for federal courts to be involved in the
protection of individual rights); Abrahamson, Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 Sw. L.J. 951,
970-71 (1982) (state courts are protective of maintaining the role of the United States Supreme
Court).
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I. Individual Rights to Free Speech
Again we have a recurring fact situation: A group of citizens want
to pass out leaflets or collect signatures on a political document in a pri-
vately owned shopping mall. There are 3,000 enclosed malls in this
country and another 20,000 or so shopping centers of various sizes,
38
many replete with tropical foliage, comfortable benches, ornamental
fountains, climate controlled air, recorded music, and deputized security
forces. The malls, with names like Woodfield, Northgate, Hilldale and
Southdale-Garrison Keillor of the fictional Lake Wobegon has added
the Chippendale and Mondale shopping malls to Minneapolis-attract
thousands of people each day, replacing the central business district in
many communities.
The mall owners seek to bar these free expression activities even
though they do not disrupt normal business operations or the conven-
ience of customers. Some might title this part of the lecture "Discount-
ing Freedom of Speech: Closeout at the Mall," or simply, "Just Shut Up
and Shop."
The mall cases are not about merchandising. The cases present a
conflict among several of this country's most cherished tenets: freedom of
expression, private property, limited government and federalism. The
resolution of the cases implicates Justice Tobriner's principles of the in-
terplay of precedent and change and the state's role in protecting individ-
ual rights against the government and private centers of power.
In 1970 the California Supreme Court concluded by a six to one
vote, with Justice Tobriner in the majority, that persons seeking signa-
tures on an initiative petition at the Inland Center, the largest shopping
mall in San Bernardino County, were entitled to engage in this peaceful,
orderly free expression activity.39 The California court based its decision
on the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal constitution.
The Inland Center mall sought certiorari. The United States
Supreme Court refused to hear the case. Two years later the United
States Supreme Court took an Oregon case that was almost identical to
the earlier California case, Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, and held that the indi-
viduals had no first amendment rights on private property.' °
On the strength of the Tanner decision, the Inland Center mall re-
turned to the California Supreme Court seeking reconsideration. The
38. Peck, Just Shut Up and Shop, THE PROGRESSIVE, Oct. 1987, at 23.
39. Diamond v. Bland, 3 Cal. 3d 653, 477 P.2d 733, 91 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1970), cert. and
reh'g denied sub nom. Homart Devel. Co. v. Diamond, 402 U.S. 988, 404 U.S. 874 (1971), 405
U.S. 981 (1972), 409 U.S. 897 (1972).
40. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 570 (1972).
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California Supreme Court concluded, in contrast to its position in the
Krivda garbage case, that in light of the most recent United States
Supreme Court decision the mall owners could bar the political activ-
ity.41 Justice Tobriner joined Justice Mosk's dissent, objecting to the ma-
jority's disregard for basic guarantees in the state constitution and the
independent nonfederal grounds upon which the earlier opinion could
have been based. The two justices characterized the majority opinion as
"a blow to fundamental principles of federalism as old as our republic."'42
Five years later in 1979 several high school students, relying on the
California constitution, sought relief when the Pruneyard Shopping
Center prohibited them from soliciting signatures to protest a United Na-
tions resolution condemning Zionism.43 The California constitution, in
contrast to the negative proscription of the federal constitution, provides,
"Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments
on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may
not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press."" Forty-three states
have constitutional provisions linguistically similar to the California
constitution.45
The California Supreme Court held that the state constitution
granted the individual greater protections than the federal constitution
and protected reasonable petitioning in privately owned shopping
centers.
The United States Supreme Court agreed to review the case. Ac-
cording to Justice Mosk, the "California court sensed doom to its theory
of state constitutionalism."'  The California Supreme Court was pleas-
antly surprised. In 1980, Justice William Rehnquist, writing for a Court
unanimous in judgment, affirmed the decision of the California Supreme
Court.47 The Pruneyard case reaffirmed the principle that states were
41. Diamond v. Bland, 11 Cal. 3d 331, 521 P.2d 460, 113 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1974).
42. Id. at 336, 521 P.2d at 464, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 472. For criticism that the California
Supreme Court was inconsistent in resting decisions on state or federal grounds, see Barnett,
The Supreme Court of California, 1981-1982 Foreword: The Emerging Court, 71 CALIF. L.
REv. 1134, 1189 (1983); Linde, E. Pluribus-Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA.
L. REv. 165, 177 (1984).
43. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr.
854 (1979). For a discussion of the Pruneyard case, see J. GRODIN, IN PuRsurr OF JuSTIcE,
124-26 (1989).
44. CAL. CONsT. art. 1, § 2.
45. Note, Private Abridgement of Speech and the State Constitutions, 90 YALE L.J. 165,
180-81 n.79 (1980).
46. Mosk, The Emerging Agenda in State Constitutional Rights Law, 496 ANNALS 54, 63
(1988).
47. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall and Stevens joined Justice Rehnquist's opinion; Justices
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free to guarantee to individuals liberties more expansive than those con-
ferred by the federal constitution. Pruneyard reiterated that the First
Amendment to the federal constitution does not reach private action.
Furthermore, Pruneyard made clear that state constitutional provisions
construed to permit individuals reasonably to exercise free speech and
petition rights on the property of a privately owned shopping center to
which the public is invited do not implicate the mall owners' federally
protected property or free speech rights.4"
In the decade following Pruneyard, ten state courts have addressed
the issue of individual free expression in shopping malls under the state
constitution's guarantee of freedom of expression.49 Most state courts
have held that their constitutional free speech provisions, like the First
Amendment, govern state action only and do not proscribe the conduct
of private parties who limit free expression on their own property.50 En-
vironmentalists, Lyndon LaRouche supporters, women's rights activists,
socialists, and protesters of nuclear power, the draft and telephone rates
have been forced out of the mall.
Some of these state courts chose to incorporate the federal constitu-
tional concept of state action into their state constitutions even though
the framers of the state constitutions apparently deliberately stated the
right of free expression in broader language than the First Amendment.
51
White and Blackmun joined in parts of the opinion; Justice Marshall filed a concurring opin-
ion. Justice Powell filed an opinion concurring in part and in the judgment in which Justice
White joined, and Justice Blackmun filed a statement concurring in part. Id. at 75-76.
48. Id. at 88. Recent cases have moved commentators to question the continued validity
of Pruneyard's holding that the states were not unconstitutionally interfering with the mall
owners' property rights. See, e.g., Note, Speech Activists in Shopping Centers: Must Property
Rights Give Way to Free Expression?, 64 WASH. L. REv. 133 (1989).
49. Lloyd Corp. v. Whiffen, 307 Or. 674, 773 P.2d 1294 (1989); Southcenter Joint Ven-
ture v. Nat'l Democratic Policy Comm., 113 Wash. 2d 413, 780 P.2d 1282 (1989); Fiesta Mall
Venture v. Mecham Recall Comm., 159 Ariz. 371, 767 P.2d 719 (Ariz. App. 1989); Jacobs v.
Major, 139 Wis. 2d 492, 407 N.W.2d 832 (1987); Western Pennsylvania Socialist Workers
1982 Campaign v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 512 Pa. 23, 515 A.2d 1331 (1986);
Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, 423 Mich. 188, 378 N.W.2d 337 (1985); SHAD Alli-
ance v. Smith Haven Mall, 66 N.Y.2d 496, 488 N.E.2d 1211 (1985); Cologne v. Westfarms
Assocs., 192 Conn. 48, 469 A.2d 1201 (1984); Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, 388 Mass. 83,
445 N.E.2d 590 (1983); State v. Felmet, 302 N.C. 173, 273 S.E.2d 708 (1981); Alderwood
Assocs. v. Washington Environmental Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 108 (1981).
50. See, e.g., Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, 432 Mich. 188, 378 N.W.2d 337
(1985); Southcenter Joint Venture v. National Democratic Policy Comm., 113 Wash. 2d 413,
780 P.2d 1282 (1989).
51. For commentary on the mall cases and the state action requirement, see Levinson,
Freedom of Speech and the Right of Access to Private Property under State Constitutional Law,
DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, ch. 2 (McGraw ed. 1985); Friesen,
Should California's Constitutional Guarantees of Individual Rights Apply Against Private Ac-
tors?, 17 HASrINGS CONST. L.Q. 111 (1989); Sundby, Is Abandoning State Action Asking Too
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Furthermore, by incorporating the federal constitutional concept of state
action as a state constitutional law doctrine the courts were adopting a
theory characterized as a "conceptual disaster area."52
Let us compare the development of state constitutional law in the
mall and the garbage cases. In the mall cases the federal and state consti-
tutional provisions are different. In the garbage cases the federal and
state constitutional provisions are virtually identical. In the mall cases
the United States Supreme Court expressly endorsed the states' power to
adopt a more expansive view of free expression than the federal constitu-
tion adopts. In contrast, some United States Supreme Court justices dis-
paraged the state courts' adopting more expansive protections for the
criminal defendant than the federal constitution grants.53 One point of
convergence seems to be that commentators are critical of the United
States Supreme Court's analysis of both the law of search and seizure and
state action.
54
Despite the disparities between the garbage and free speech issues,
adopting federal constitutional interpretation as the interpretation of the
state constitution was the norm. Put plainly, the state courts showed an
unwillingness to deviate from the United States Supreme Court in the
mall cases just as they had in the garbage cases. Why, we might ask?
The explanation does not lie in the value of uniformity stressed in
the criminal cases. People are accustomed to different states having dif-
ferent property laws. The moral authority of the United States Supreme
Much of the Constitution?, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 139 (1989); Margulies, A Terrible
Beauty: Functional State Action Analysis and State Constitutions, 9 WHrrTIER L. REv. 723
(1988); Dolliver, The Washington Constitution and "State Action". The View of the Framers,
22 WILLAMErrE L. REv. 445 (1986); Ragosta, Free Speech Access to Shopping Malls Under
State Constitutions: Analysis and Rejection, 37 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1 (1986); The Supreme
Court -1979 Term, State-Guaranteed Right to Speak in Privately Owned Shopping Centers, 94
HARV. L. REv. 75, 169 (1980); Note, Post-Pruneyard Access to Michigan Shopping Centers:
The "Mailing" of Constitutional Rights, 30 WAYNE L. REv. 93 (1983); Note, Free Speech,
Initiative and Property Rights in Conflict - Four Alternatives to the State Action Requirement
in Washington, 58 WASH. L. REv. 587 (1983); Rossman, Leaflets in Shopping Malh, America's
New Main Street, Letter to the Editor, N. Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1985.
52. Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term - Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection
and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69, 95 (1967). See also Southcenter Joint
Venture v. National Democratic Policy Comm., 113 Wash. 2d 413, 780 P.2d 1282, 1303 (Ut-
ter, J., concurring); Cole, Federal and State "State Action' The Undereritical Embrace of a
Hypercriticized Doctrine, 24 GA. L. REV. 327 (1991); Devlin, Constructing an Alternative to
"State Action" As A Limit on State Constitutional Rights Guarantees: A Survey, Critique and
Proposal, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 819 (1991).
53. See, eg., Florida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 637, 639 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
54. See, e-g., 1 LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.2 (2d ed. 1987); Black, The Supreme
Court, 1966 Term - Foreword." "State Action," Equal Protection and California's Proposition
14, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69 (1967).
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Court does not seem to be undermined when the United States Supreme
Court appears to encourage state courts to make up their own minds on
free expression in a mall. People would not be confused or label the law
illogical if individuals could set up booths to gather signatures on a peti-
tion in one mall but not in another. Moreover, protecting free speech is a
more popularly accepted notion than suppressing evidence of a drug
deal.
One explanation is that developing the law to allow free expression
in malls is not easy. Having struggled with a mall case in my own home
state, I know. Read my dissent.55
The division of justices within the state courts, the close votes and
the vociferous dissents in the shopping mall cases demonstrate the diffi-
culty the state courts face in balancing the competing rights and develop-
ing an interpretation of the state constitutional guarantee of free
expression to govern the mall cases.
Granting individuals access to private property for purposes of free
expression increases potential litigation. Granting access might mean
courts would, on a case-by-case basis, balance the right of access with the
reasonableness of the malls' rules regulating the time, place and manner
of expression. And right of access to private property does not end with
polite political speech and it does not end at the shopping mall. What
about the free expression rights of individuals who are engaging in com-
mercial speech or artistic expression? What about different venues? Re-
tirement communities, nursing homes, and abortion clinics? Anti-
abortion picketers have attempted to rely on state constitutions to go
onto private parking lots or into clinics to counsel pregnant women seek-
ing abortion.
56
The very difficulty of the mall cases may argue in favor of a state-by-
state resolution of the dispute and experimentation rather than national
decision-making by the United States Supreme Court. On the other
hand, this same difficulty may discourage state courts from striking out
on their own.
55. Jacobs v. Major, 139 Wis. 2d 492, 531, 407 N.W.2d 832, 848 (1987) (Abrahamson, J.,
dissenting).
56. See, eg., State v. Horn, 139 Wis. 2d 473, 407 N.W.2d 854 (1987); State v. Migliorino,
150 Wis. 2d 513, 442 N.W.2d 36 (1989). Resort to state constitutions does not belong to any
one philosophical or political group. See Right to Life Advocates v. Aaron Women's Clinic,
737 S.W.2d 564 (Trex. App. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 824 (1988). For a discussion of this
case, see Linzer, Why Bother with State Bills of Rights?, 68 TEx. L. REv. 1573, 1576, 1599-
1601 (1990).
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In both the garbage cases and the mall cases, most state courts have
adopted the federal interpretation of individual rights although the impe-
tus for doing so may have been different.
We turn to my last series of cases, individual rights to education.
I. Individual Rights to Education
Once again we see the courts dealing with a recurring issue: the local
property tax as a traditional means of raising money for education.
While poorer school districts may tax at higher rates than more affluent
ones, the poorer districts raise less money because of the lower value of
the property and spend less for each pupil than the richer districts. The
California Supreme Court explained: "[A]ffiuent districts can have their
cake and eat it too: they can provide a high quality education for their
children while paying lower taxes. Poor districts, by contrast, have no
cake at all.""7
In 1971 the California Supreme Court in the six to one Serrano deci-
sion, with Justice Tobriner in the majority,58 held that the public school
financing system, with its reliance on local property taxes and resultant
wide disparities in school revenue available per pupil, invidiously dis-
criminates against the poor and violates the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal constitution. Time Magazine
commented that "potentially the [Serrano] decision is the most far-reach-
ing court ruling in schooling since Brown v. Board of Education.
'59
Two years after Serrano, the United States Supreme Court rejected
the claim of San Antonio children that finance disparities infringed upon
the right of the children to equal protection under the federal Constitu-
tion." Education is not a fundamental right according to the United
States Supreme Court. Critical to the majority's analysis was its reading
of the federal Constitution as a catalogue of negative proscriptions.61
The Court believed that the federal constitution protects citizens only
when laws deprive, infringe, or interfere with a person's fundamental lib-
erties and that "[i]t is not the province of [the United States Supreme]
Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaran-
57. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 600, 487 P.2d 1241, 1251-52, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 611-
12 (1971). For a discussion of this case, see Karst, Serrano v. Priest: A State Court's Responsi-
bilities and Opportunities in the Development of Federal Constitutional Law, 60 CALIF. L. REv.
720 (1972).
58. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
59. TIME, Sept. 13, 1971, at 43.
60. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972).
61. See Neuborne, Foreword: State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20
RUTGERS L.J. 881, 887, n.76 (1989).
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teeing equal protection of the laws." 62
Moreover the Court confessed its lack of competence to make wise
decisions with respect to the raising and disposition of public revenues,
the goals of education, and the correlation between educational expendi-
tures and quality of education. The Court also acknowledged that con-
siderations of federalism counseled against its interfering with the state
education system. Federalism, according to the San Antonio case, re-
quires state officials to exercise primary responsibility for resolving edu-
cational issues; education is a state function.63
The attempt to gain relief under the federal constitution foundered
because the federal constitution had no textual basis supporting a govern-
mental duty to educate. In contrast, the fifty state constitutions recog-
nize, with varying formulations, the state's duty to establish and
maintain a system of publicly funded schools. 
6
Following the San Antonio case, New Jersey in 197365 and Califor-
nia in 197766 were the first states to address the constitutionality of their
school financing under their respective state constitutions. Both states
declared the school financing systems unconstitutional, relying on the
state constitution's equal protection provision and the state constitu-
tional provisions requiring thorough and efficient education. In 1990, in
yet another round of this apparently interminable New Jersey litigation,
the New Jersey Supreme Court, by unanimous vote, declared the state's
most recent school financing formula unconstitutional.67
As of 1990, more than twenty state appellate courts have considered
challenges to school funding schemes. About ten state courts have struck
down their state statutes, but even more have upheld them.68 Within the
62. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1972).
63. Id. at 42. The Court announced, "[T]he consideration and initiation of fundamental
reforms with respect to state taxation and education are matters reserved for the legislative
processes of the various States, and we do no violence to the values of federalism and separa-
tion of powers by staying our hand." Id. at 58.
64. "The constitutions of 40 states clearly mandate that the legislature 'establish', 'main-
tain', 'support', or 'provide for' some sort of system of public schools. There is some ambiguity
about the constitutions of Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hamp-
shire, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Vermont." U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION
ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM:
SELECTED ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR STATE INITIATIVES, 115 n.1, A-113 (July 1989);
Note, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional Provisions in Public School
Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. REv. 1639, 1661-70 (1989).
65. Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
66. Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1977).
67. Abbot v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 575 A.2d 359 (1990).
68. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Ken-
tucky, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyo-
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last two years the Montana,69 Kentucky7° and Texas71 supreme courts
have struck down their statutes, while Wisconsin upheld its funding
scheme (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).72 School financing cases are pend-
ing in twelve states and efforts to organize suits in five other states are
being considered.73
While federalism-the relation of the federal and state govern-
ments-was one stumbling block for the federal Supreme Court, separa-
tion of powers is the stumbling block for many state courts to declare the
financing laws invalid. The state courts do not wish to transgress, and
properly so, the line between the judicial and legislative role of govern-
ment by dictating to the legislature how the school system must be
financed.74
ming have considered state constitutional challenges to the funding schemes for their public
school systems. Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Kentucky, Montana, New Jersey, Texas,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming declared the state funding scheme unconstitutional.
For a catalogue of the school financing cases and the bases of the decisions, see Catalano
and Modisher, State Constitutional Issues in Public School Funding Challenges, 2 EMERGING
ISSUES IN STATE CONST. LAW 207 (1989). For a discussion of West Virginia school financing,
see R. NEELY, How COURTS GOVERN AMERICA, 170-89 (1981).
69. Helena Elementary School Dist. v. State, 236 Mont. 63, 769 P.2d 684 (1989).
70. Rose v. Council for Better Education, 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
71. Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989). The Texas
Supreme Court struck down the Texas legislature's latest school financing plan in Edgewood
Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491 (rex. 1991), reh'g overruled, 34 TEX. Sup. CT. J.
368 (Tex. 1991).
72. Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 436 N.W.2d 568 (1989).
73. Equivalent Education: Suits Attack Funding That Favors Rich Schools over Poor, 76
A.B.A. J. (Aug. 1990) at 10.
For commentary on the school finance cases, see Hubsch, Education and Self-Govern-
ment: The Right to Education under State Constitutional Law, 18 J. L. & EDuc. 93 (1989);
Hugg, Federalism Full Circle: Relief for Education Discrimination, 35 LoY. L. REv. 13
(1989); Downey, Constitutional Theory: Federalism in the Michigan v. Long Era and Delaware
v. Van Ardsell - The Continued Need for Coherent Adjudication, in 1988 ANNUAL SURVEY
OF AMERICAN LAW 503; Note, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional
Provisions in Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. REV. 1639 (1989); Pierce,
School Finance, 67 OR. L. REv. 31 (1988); Note, Equal Educational Opportunity Revisited:
Abbott v. Burke and the "Thorough and Efficient" Law in New Jersey, 40 RUTGERS L. REV.
193 (1987); Note, The Egalitarian Roots of the Education Article of the Wisconsin Constitution:
Old History, New Interpretation, Buse v. Smith Criticized, 1981 WIs. L. REV. 1325 (1981); U.S.
ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS, ch. 12 (Robert F. Williams ed., M-159, Oct. 1988); U.S. ADVISORY
COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM: SELECTED ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR STATE INITIATIVES 109, A-113 (July
1989).
74. U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE CONSTITU-
TIONS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM: SELECTED ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR STATE INITIA-
TIVES 112, A-113 (July 1989).
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In all three areas-search and seizure of garbage, free expression in
the malls, and the right to education-the United States Supreme Court
has refused to extend federal protection of individual rights. It is in the
area of education that most state constitutional law cases have arisen and
more state courts have developed a jurisprudence independent of federal
constitutional law. Why?
Is it because the differences between the federal and the state consti-
tutions are most pronounced in education? Is it because the state courts
face less federal intervention in education than in garbage or the malls?
Is it because education has traditionally been recognized as a state obliga-
tion, while restraining unreasonable searches and seizures and restraining
interference with free expression have been regarded in recent years as
federal issues? Is it because the state courts recognize that they are unen-
cumbered by the institutional restraints that the federal courts suffer? Is
it because neither the people nor the judges expect uniformity from state
to state in educational matters and that diversity is acceptable? Is it be-
cause unless the state courts act, there is little likelihood that the federal
courts or the state legislatures will?
Commentators have noted that almost independent of whether the
state supreme court upheld or struck down the finance law, the school
financing decisions have been very influential. State legislatures have be-
gun to struggle with recasting funding mechanisms to assure a thorough
and efficient education for all children. Poverty lawyers are urging that
the reasoning of the school finance cases be transferred to other kinds of
public services, and they are looking to state constitutional law as one of
the vehicles for awakening government to the plight of children and the
poor.75
75. See, e.g., Braveman, Children, Poverty and State Constitutions, 38 EMORY L.J. 577
(1989); Neuborne, Foreword: State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20
RUTGERS L.J. 881, 892-96 (1989).
Justice Tobriner wrote of the Serrano decision as follows:
Another massive movement in the economic legal sphere is the rise of the new equal
protection doctrine and its resplendent exemplar, Serrano v. Priest. Justice Sullivan
struck down as unconstitutional the grotesque system of school financing that is tied
to local taxes, usually on real property, so that poorer districts bear a discriminatory
burden. As Professor Karst stated, "The novelty in the Serrano opinion's characteri-
zation of education as a fundamental interest is not the recognition of education's
importance; it is that Serrano coupled the interest in education with wealth discrimi-
nation rather than racial discrimination." Karst raises the query whether the reason-
ing of the decision is "transferable from education to other kinds of public services
such as fire and police protection, hospitals, or recreational facilities-a question
which the court properly did not address."
Tobriner, Retrospect: Ten Years on the California Supreme Court, 20 UCLA L. REv. 5, 11-12
(1972) (quoting Karst, supra note 57).
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IV. Conclusion
Let me summarize the lessons I draw about state constitutional law
development from the cases we have explored.
First, after two decades of discussion of state constitutional law and
thousands of cases in which state courts have interpreted their constitu-
tions, state courts and lawyers still tend to apply the federal constitution
and United States Supreme Court cases rather than the state constitu-
tion. It is not clear whether the habits and training of the 1960s and
1970s with emphasis on federal law (and this emphasis continues in
1990) are too strong to be overcome; whether the lawyers have not raised
the state constitutional issues in the cases; whether judges and lawyers
are insecure about the correct way to approach state constitutional is-
sues; or whether state judges do not wish to take responsibility and be
held accountable to the people of the state for rendering decisions under
the state constitution as the United States Supreme Court has mandated
in Michigan v. Long.
Second, change is evident nevertheless. Lawyers, judges, commenta-
tors, and law students are paying more attention to state constitutions.
As of 1990, we are dealing with a large body of state constitutional law,
as state courts examine their state constitutions more frequently than in
the past.
76
Third, state constitutional law describes a process, not a result. The
cases demonstrate that basing a decision on the state constitution does
not augur the result. State constitutional law cannot be equated with
either cases that adopt federal constitutional law or deviate from deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court. In the development of state
constitutional law, state courts have been adopting as well as departing
from decisions of the United States Supreme Court in interpreting state
constitutions. 7
76. The September/October 1990 edition of LEXIS Liaison (vol. 2, no. 5), published by
Mead Data Central, Inc., noted the lawyers' trend to turn "more frequently to state courts for
redress and protection in conflicts over individual rights and freedoms" and gives examples of
LEXIS searches for several state constitutional law questions.
77. To many observers, the phrase "state constitutional criminal law" refers only to
those state cases in which state courts interpret their own constitutions in such a way
as to depart significantly from federal constitutional law. I do not view state consti-
tutional criminal law as existing only when this law differs from the federal mold. In
using federal constitutional law as an interpretive base, a state court is still effectively
defining its own constitution. Therefore, a study of state constitutional criminal law
should include state cases that adopt federal decisions as valid interpretations of state
constitutions as well as those that do not. If the state is the laboratory, all experi-
ments must be studied.
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Fourth, state judges should be paying more attention to the state
constitutions that they have sworn to support. They must write clear
opinions stating the basis of their decisions in terms understandable to
the bar and the public affected by the decision. Two constitutions protect
individuals in our federal system, and a continuing dialogue between and
among the courts can contribute to novel construction and fresh ap-
proaches to the disputes courts must resolve.7"
Just as it seems strange to lawyers in 1990 that in the early part of
the twentieth century the federal Bill of Rights did not extend to protec-
tion of individuals against state government, future generations may look
back and wonder why state courts have ignored their state constitutions
for so long.
Let me conclude by returning to the words of Justice Tobriner-
words that will serve as a guide to state court judges moving into the
twenty-first century. "Courts must often rule," he wrote,
in a night that has no light of precedent and no beacon of scientific
proof. They engage in the lonely task of balancing the need for
order and stability with the goal of liberty and due process, seeking
to preserve a heritage of individualism in a hierarchy of pervasive
institutionalism.79
Abrahamson, J., concurs.
Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State Constitutional
Law, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1141, 1166 (1985).
See Latzer, The Hidden Conservatism of the State Court "Revolution," 74 JUDICATURE
190 (Dec.-Jan. 1991) (concluding that most state constitutional decisions in criminal proce-
dure adopt the federal rule and that state constitutional law is not synonymous with rejection
of United States Supreme Court doctrine); Cooper, Beyond the Federal Constitution: The Sta-
tus of State Constitutional Law in Florida, 18 STETSoN L. REV. 241, 282 (1989) (concluding
that Florida courts have applied Florida constitutional law "sparingly" and advocating careful
interpretation of state constitutions so as to avoid "haphazard expansion of state constitutional
rights").
78. See U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE CON-
STITUTIONS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM: SELECTED ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR STATE
INITIATIVES (1989).
79. Tobriner, Individual Rights in an Industrialized Society, 54 A.B.A. J. 21, 23 (1968).
